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FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL: How may a defendant's right to a fair criminal
trial be protected from prejudicial newspaper publicity?
DONALD K. BASTA
"Freedom of the press, properly conceived, is
hasic to our constitutional system. Safeguards
of the fair administration of justice are en-
shrined in our Bill of Rights. Respect for both
of these indispensable elements of our constitu-
tional system presents some of the most difficult
and delicate problems for adjudication." Mem-
orandum by Frankfurter, J., denying certiorari,
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S.
912, 919 (1950).
The first amendment provides for freedom of the
press.' Thus the press may report to the public the
facts of crimes, as well as the backgrounds of
persons accused of crime, so long as these publica-
tions are not libelous.2 In its zeal to inform the
public, the press sometimes publishes information
which tends to establish or disprove to the public
the charges against a defendant.3 Such newspaper
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
Freedom of the press is not an absolute and un-
fettered license, Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis
v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.
1926); but may be limited where in the public interest
as libel, Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122
F.2d 288 (2nd Cir. affd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942); or as
sedicious material, Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 277 (S.D.
N.Y. 1930).
3 Recently in Chicago, one Barry Cook was indicted,
tried, and acquitted of the murder of middle-aged
Margaret Gallagher. Miss Gallagher was beaten to
death July 22, 1956, while sunbathing in a Chicago
lake shore park. Cook was suspected of the murder
because of the similarity of the pattern of his attacks on
other women with the murder of Miss Gallagher.
publicity, when read by prospective jurors prior
to the trial or by jurors during the trial, may in-
fluence their decision in the case.
While in prison for assaults on several women, Cook
supposedly confessed the murder.
Prior to his trial, Chicago newspapers ran many
articles on Cook, the murder, supposed evidence
expected by the press to be offered at the trial, and the
expected outcome of the trial. Even though Cook was
acquitted, many of the reports were highly prejudicial
to his defense.
For example, some of the publications rebutted
Cook's presumption of innocence: "There is no longer
any considerable doubt about who killed Miss Gal-
lagher. The police of Chicago can fairly claim to have
solved the murder.... " Chicago Tribune, October 17,
1958, p. 10 (Editorial). Other publications contained
admissions not admitted in evidence as that Cook had
confessed ("Beating her numerous times on the head
and shoulders, ripping off her clothes, and then con-
tinuing to beat her", Chicago Daily News, Oct. 14,
1958, p. 1, 7); or Cook's criminal background which is
irrelevant to proof of the murder and usually inadmis-
sible at trial (the "questioning took place in Joliet
Prison where Cook is serving a 1-14 years prison term
for assault of women and attempted robbery," Chicago
Daily News, Oct. 16, 1958, p. 6); accusations by police
concerning crimes with which Cook was not charged
(Cook "is still the prime suspect in the Judy May
Anderson murder. There is no doubt in my mind that
Cook killed Judy too, Fitzgerald said," Ibid.); character
traits usually not admissible and not relevant to proof
of the crime (detectives described Cook "as the most
vicious sadist we have ever encountered," Chicago
Daily News, Oct. 14, 1958, p. 5); accusations by
witnesses not then available for cross-examination
("Four witnesses place Cook at the.., scene or near
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
The Constitution, of course, does not provide
for the determination of criminal guilt or innocence
by the press.4 It does provide, however, that one
accused of crime is entitled to a public trial by an
impartial jury,5 and this judicial determination
should not be "in competition with any other
means for establishing the charge." 6
The purpose of this paper is to consider how a
defendant's right to a fair criminal trial may be
protected from the prejudicial effects of newspaper
publicity without infringing upon the freedom of
the press.
It should be noted at the outset that fair com-
ment on the facts of the crime and the background
of the accused, when accurately and objectively
written, is not offensive unless the material is in-
admissible as evidence at the accused's trial. On
the other hand, the publication of slanted, in-
correctaccounts, or of factually accuratebut legally
prejudicial accounts of the crime and the accused,
is objectionable. These publications, which portray
the guilt or innocence of the accused, will be called
trial by newspaper.
Trial by newspaper is undesirable. By virtue
of its influence on a judge or jury, trial by news-
paper deprives the defendant of his right under the
sixth amendment to be faced by his accusers and
to cross-examine them, to present rebuttal or
affirmative evidence in his own defense, and to a
trial by an impartial jury.7 Trial by newspaper also
deprives the accused of the safeguards of the rules
of evidence and of the traditional presumption of
innocence.
by... ," Chicago Daily News, Oct. 16, 1958, p. 6);
irrelevant and inflammatory admissions not admissible
in evidence (Cook "has admitted more than 200 attacks
and attempted assaults on women in the area in the
last three years," Chicago Daily News, Oct. 14, 1958,
p. 1 (Bulletins); see also Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 15,
1958, p. 31).
4 The term "Press" will be used herein to cover all
forms of news reporting media.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6 Memorandum opinion of Frankfurter, J., denying
certiorari, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338
U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
7 Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50, 52 (1951) (Con-
curring opin!on). Also see: U.S. CONsT. amend VI; and
similar provisions found in state constitutions as, ILL.
CONST. art. IH, sec. 9, (1870). The sixth amendment does
not apply to state proceedings. In the absence of an
appropriate state constitutional provision, however, the
right to a fair and impartial trial would be implicit in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the federal constitution. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942).
First Amendment Prohibits Judicial Control
of Trial by Newspaper
In order to understand dearly the conflici be-
tween the individual's right to a fair trial and
freedom of the press, one must consider the his-
torical development of the law in this area.
At common law, before the time of Blackstone,
constructive contempt of court-that is, contempt
by publication, words, or acts outside the court's
presence--was unknown.8 The theory of construc-
tive contempt first appeared in Blackstone's
treatise. Blackstone's thepry that "speaking or
writing contemptuously of the court or judges,
acting in their judicial capacity"9 constituted con-'
tempt was based on an undelivered opinion of
Judge Wilmot from the case of King v. -Alman.1
Judge Wilmot, a friend of Blackstone, was re-
moved from the bench before he could deliver his'
opinion. Nevertheless, Blackstone accepted the
theory and published it as the law of England."
In the formative years of American legal think-
ing, Blackstone was often the sole source of ju-
dicial authority, and his theory was accepted as
law. Around the end of the 18th century, however,
two protests were heard with respect to the sum-*
mary exercise by state courts of the power of
constructive contempt. Several unpopular deci-
sions marked the beginning of a trend toward
abandonment of Blackstone's theory.
8 Fox, HisroRy oF CoNTEr nr oF CouRT 21 (1927).
94 BL. Comm. 285.
30 [1765] Wilm. 243.
,1 English courts have strongly supported the use of
constructive contempt to control the press. Under
English law, any publication that can be reasonably
calculated, by the court, to interfere with the adminis-
tration of justice is contempt. Actual interference need
not be shown, nor is intent a material factor of the
contempt. Depending on the circumstances of each
case, a publication may be contempt merely if it was
one which might conceivably prejudice a pending trial.
Rex v. Daily Mail, 44 T.L.R. 303, 306 (K.B. 1928);
Ludwig, Journalism and Justice in Crininal Law, 28
ST. JOHNS L. REv. 197 (1954).
The following publications have been cited as con-
tempt in England: the publication of information not
admissible as evidence, King v. Tibbits, (1902) K.B.
77 (1901); pre-trial comments accusing the defendant
of other crimes, King v. Parke, (1903) 2 K.B. 432; sup-
posed confessions, Rex v. Clarke, 27 T.K.R. 32 (K.B.
1910); findings of private investigations, Rex v.
Evening Standard, 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924); cartoons
or pictures of the accused or related to the crime or the
accused, Rex v. Daily Herald, 75 Sol. J. 119 (K.B.
1931); King v. Daily Mirror, (1927) 1 K.B. 845. Rex v.
Hutchison, (1936) 2 All Eng. 1514 (K.B.). Also see:
Appendix to memorandum opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
denying certiorari, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show
338 U.S. 912 (1949); HALSBURY's LAWS or ENGLAND,
Contempt of Court, §2 (2nd. ed. 1932).
1959].,.
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In one of these cases, Republic v. Oswald, -12
Oswald, an editor and publisher, was held in con-
tempt for having claimed possible prejudice on
the part of a Pennsylvania trial court during a
pending libel suit because a brother of one of the
parties sat on the Supreme Court of the State.
Oswald later asked the legislature to impeach the
judges. Although the impeachment attempt failed,
the incident illustrates the rise of public sentiment
against judicial restraint of the press.
The holding of the Oswald case was followed in
1802 in a similar Pennsylvania case, Republic v.
Passmore.3 Also, there again followed an at-
tempted impeachment of the judges. Finally, in
1810, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute
abolishing constructive contempt. 14 Similarly, in
New York, the case of People v. Yates's gave rise
to a New York statute abolishing constructive
contempt.'
6
Federal law soon followed the trend begun by
the states. In 1826, judge Peck of the United
States District Court of Missouri imposed an
eighteen month suspension of practice on a lawyer,
Luke Lawless, for having published an unfair
criticism of the judge's opinion against him in a
land grant case. Lawless later petitioned Congress
to impeach Judge Peck.'7 The attempted impeach-
ment failed, but in 1831 Congress passed an act
prohibiting summary punishment for contempts
not committed "in the presence of the court, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of jus-
lice." 1 (Emphasis added.) Early cases interpreted
the new federal statute strictly. In the case of
Ex parte Poulson" the court interpreted the phrase
"in the presence of the court" to mean physical
presence, thus placing a geographical limitation
on the contemptuous act committed.
1- 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788).
133 Yeares (Pa.) 438 (1802).
1 PA., Acrs (1808-1809), ch. 78, p. 146.
1s 6 Johns R. (N.Y.) 355 (1810).
16 N.Y. REv. STAT., (1829), part iii, c. iii, tit. 2, sec.
10. Drafting of the New York act was influenced by a
model code proposed in LIVINGSTON, SYSTEM OF PENAL
LAW, (1st. ed. 1824). Livingston proposed that the
courts should only have the power to cite in contempt
those acts that take place in the actual presence of the
court.
'7 STRANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JUDGE
PEcK (1833).
184 STAT. 487 (1831); currently see, 62 STAT. 701,
18 U.S.C.A. 401 (1948).
'1 19 Fed. Cas. 1207 (No. 11,350) (E.D. Pa. 1835).
Also see: United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 27
Fed. Cas. 91 (No. 15, 867) (C.C. Mass. 1885); Culyler v.
Atlantic & N.C. R. Co., 131 Fed. 95 (S.D. N.Y.
1904).
By the time of the Civil War, twenty-three of
the thirty-three states had statutes similar to those
of Pennsylvania, New York, and the United
States.' After the Civil War, however, the trend
toward abolition of constructive contempt changed
its course. Slowly the state and lower federal courts
returned to the view of Blackstone. Statutes which
prohibited constructive contempt were overcome
by either finding them unconstitutional2 ' or by
reasoning that the statutes were declaratory rather
than mandatory.
2
The Supreme Court of the U nited States joined
the trend and returned to the view of Blackstone
in the case of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States.M In that case, petitioner was held in con-
tempt for severely criticizing the trial judge's
finding in connection with the re-negotiation of a
street car franchise. The Court found that the con-
tempt statute of 1831 did no more than express a
limitation on the constitutional power of the Court
to sustain itself. The portion of the act reading "or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice" was interpreted as establishing a test
of causation which looked to the effect of the con-
temptuous act upon the court. Earlier appellate
court interpretations placing a geographic limita-
tion on the contemptuous act were thus over-
turned.
The view of the Toledo Newspaper case re-
mained as the federal law of constructive contempt
until 1941 when the case was reversed by Nye v.
United States.24 Nye, an attorney, was held in con-
tempt for acts committed one hundred miles from
the court room. On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
turned to a strict interpretation of the contempt
act, holding that Congress intended to limit the
2.0 Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the
United States, 28 COL. L. REV. 401, 525, 533 (1928).
More recently in Ludwig, Journalism and Justice in
Criminal Law, 28 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 197, 218 (1954),
the author points out that as of 1954, twenty-si.x states
had no statute prohibiting constructive contempt or
had codified the common law; seven states privileged
true reports; six states by statute provided that the
press could be held in contempt; one state privileged
only non-libelous material; and eight states had
statutes similar to the Federal Act.
2" Ex parle Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 126, 136 Atl. 312
(1927); In re Merrill, 88 N.J. Eq. 261, 283-84, 102 At.
400 (1917); Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 811,
813, 32 S.E. 780 (1899).
2 Nichols v. Judge, 130 Mich. 187, 193, 89 N.W. 691
(1902); Ex parte Barry, 85 Calif. 603, 25 Pac. 256
(1890); People v. Wilson, 64 11. 195 (1872). Nelles &
King, Contempt by Publication in The United States, 28
COL. L. REv. 525, 537 (1928).
247 U.S. 402 (1918).
24 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
[Vol. 50
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTR-4CTS
contempt power of the federal courts to acts having
a geographic relationship to the court room.
Since the Nye case concerned only federal courts,
the power of the state courts to cite summarily for
constructive contempt continued until the 1941
decisions of the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Cali-
fornia and its companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v.
California.-5
Bridges was convicted of contempt by the Cali-
fornia court for sending a threatening telegram to
the Secretary of Labor stating that he would call a
longshoremen's strike on the west coast if the court
found against him in a harbor area union repre-
sentation dispute. The Times-Mirror was con-
victed of contempt for publishing editorials during
a pending criminal trial of labor union organizers.
The editorials called for strict sentences rather
than mere probation or parole. The California
Supreme Court affirmed the contempt citations in
both cases.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed both cases. The Court held that the
freedoms of the first amendment which are im-
plicit in the due process guarantee of the four-
teenth amendment prohibited the state courts from
punishing for constructive contempt publications
or statements which tended to affect the outcome
of the pending trial unless the publications or
statements presented a clear and present danger to
the impartial administration of justice. The
Bridges case did not go so far as the Nye case and
require that the contemptuous act transpire in the
physical proximity of the court room- The sole re-
quirement was that the acts constitute a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice.
The question of what is a dear and present
danger to the impartial administration of justice
cannot be answered in exact words or terms. In
Bridges the Court said that to constitute a clear
and present danger the "substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence ex-
tremely high before utterances can be punished."26
Subsequent, cases have further developed the
philosophy and defined the limits of the clear and
present danger test. In Pennekamp v. Florida the
Court characterized the problem as one of striking
"a balance between the desirability of free dis-
cussion and the necessity for fair adjudication,
free from interruption of its processes. ' ' 7 The
25 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
26 Id. at 263.
2328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946). Petitioners published
two editorials portraying the judge as the friend of
Court then proceeded to reverse the contempt cita-
tion, which grew out of a severe criticism of the
Court during a bench trial for rape, holding that
although it must protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial, ."Freedom of discussion should be
given the widest range compatible with the essen-
tial requirements of the fair and orderl- adminis-
tration of justice."-
In Craig v. Harney 2 1 the press was cited for
contempt in attacking the judge, an elected lay-
man, who refused to accept a jury verdict in a
forcible entry and detainer action. The criticism
came after the trial but during the pendancy of a
motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court, in re-
versing, stated that freedom of the press should
not be impaired "unless there is no doubt that the
utterances... are a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice." 30 (Emphasis
added.) The danger of imminent threat "must not
be remote or even probable; it must immediately
imperil" a fair trial.3 In effect, this decision seemed
to require a direct act of contemp in the presence
of the Court.
Craig v. Harney is the last decision 1anded down
by the Supreme Court on this subject. However,
in a later case, State v. Baltimore Radio Show,,n the
Marylafd Supreme Court, applying the clear and
present danger test as laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States, found that the broad-
casting of sensational commentaries on a child
murder, and about the accused and his supposed
confession and reenactment of the crime, would
not prevent a fair and impartial bench trial or
vitiate a subsequent jury trial. From the Maryland
Supreme Court decision, the state petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review on certi-
orari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivering a memorandum
opinion.n
The Baltimore Radio decision of the Maryland
Supreme Court was the first decision by any court
indicating that the clear and present danger test
crime for his action in dismissing two cases and quash-
ing an indictment for rape. The rape case was pending
on re-indictment when the publications were made, but
the Court found that the editorials did not exert a clear
and present danger to the decision of the judge. The
effect on a jury was considered too remote for consider-
ation.
28Id. at 347.
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
30 Id. at 373.
31 Id. at 376.
193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
3 See note 6 supra
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applies to jury trials as well as to situations where
only judges are concerned.? Prior cases reviewed
by the Supreme Court all involved bench trials.
Thus the Supreme Court has yet to say whether
the clear and present danger test will also be ap-
plied to pending jury trials.?5
Procedural Remedies to Protect Defendant's
Rights Under the Sixth Amendment from
Trial by Newspaper
It seems clear that the press, without fear of
citation for contempt of court, may freely practice
trial by newspaper. To protect his right to a fair
and impartial jury trial by avoiding the effects
of adverse publicity, the accused must thus look
to procedural remedies.
Selecting a jury and instructing it as to the
evidence it may consider offers the accused some
protection from trial by newspaper. Voir dire,
the examination of prospective jurors, is considered
an adequate remedy against adverse publicity on
the theory that if a fair and impartial jury can be
chosen then the inflammatory articles will have no
material effect.36 Notwithstanding a challenge for
cause, courts will allow a juror to serve who has
read the newspapers and even formed or expressed
an opinion about the outcome of the trial, unless it
appears that the juror could not yield his opinion
to the evidence presented in court.? This standard
for disqualification is harsh. It allows persons to
serve who may not realize the full effect of their
prior judgements on their present ability to reach
a decision on the evidence. The courts justify this
procedure on the basis that mass communication
makes it impossible to pick and keep a jury that
4 See note 32 supra, at 325-26.
35 See note 6 supra.
36 For cases where the trial court considered the ex-
amination of jurors on voir dire and the lack of difficulty
of choosing a jury see: Mayo v. Blackburn, 250 F.2d
645 (5th Cir. 1957); Cole v. State, 46 Okla. Crim. 365,
287 Pac. 782 (1930); State v. Gallo, 128 N.J.L. 172, 24
A.2d 557, aff'd, 129 N.J.L. 52, 28 A.2d 95 (1942).
37 Where the juror admits that he would be unable to
find on the evidence in court, he should be dismissed
for cause or a mistrial granted. Singer v. State, 109
So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959); Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172,
84 S.E.2d 365 (1954). However, where the juror merely
read the prejudicial article but stated that it did not
prejudice him against the defendant so that he could
not reach a verdict on the evidence presented in court,
the court found no ground for reversal. United States v.
Pisano, 193 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1951), United States v.
Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2nd Cir. 1951); contra, Delaney
v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
has not come in contact with the publications.3s
Thus on voir dire the defense attorney is left to
exercise his peremptory challenges wisely in an
attempt to pick out those persons more affected
than others. He also faces the dilemma of wording
his inquiry so as not to arouse the jurors' curiosity
and stimulate them to read the publications.39
Instructions by the trial judge at the outset and
close of the trial to the effect that jurors should
avoid reading commentaries on the trial and that
only the evidence presented in court should be
considered in reaching a verdict are also considered
sufficient to protect the defendant against in-
flammatory publicity. 0 It is possible that the
court's instructions may keep jurors from viewing
prejudicial publications, but it is difficult to under-
stand how the instructions may keep the jurors
from being unconsciously influenced by what they
have already read.
In a recent federal case, Marshall v. United
States,4' the Supreme Court reversed Marshall's
conviction for violation of the Pure Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and granted him a new trial on
the ground that he could not have received a
fair trial where seven members of the jury ad-
mitted reading inflammatory newspaper publicity
during the trial, even though the judge questioned
the jurymen and each stated that he was not
prejudiced by the publicity and could decide solely
on the basis of the evidence offered in court. This
decision faced up the inadequacies of judicial
instructions to the jury as a remedy for trial by
newspaper and decided that a mistrial was a more
appropriate remedy in this case.
Where publicity is so prejudicial that it cannot
be cured by voir dire or instructions to the jury,
the accused may seek a change of venue or a
continuance. 42 Publicity alone, however, is an
s Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94, 98 (10th
Cir. 1958); Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704,
709 (9th Cir. 1948); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7
(Fla. 1959).
39Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir.
1955).
40 People v. Herbert, 340 Ill. 320, 172 N.E. 740
(1930); Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th
Cir. 1953); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361 (7th
Cir. 1951); Honda v. People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P.2d
178 (1943); Commonwealth. v. Spallone, 154 Pa.Super.
282, 35 A.2d 727 (1944).
41 Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94 (10th Cir.),
re,)'d, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
2 Change of venue is the usual remedy unless the
publicity had so broad a coverage that a fair trial could
not be had elsewhere in which case continuance would
be granted. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107
(1st Cir. 1952):
[Vol. so
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insufficient ground for a change of venue or
continuance,4 unless it has so aroused public
hostility toward the accused as to make a fair
trial unlikely.44 The courts look for evidence of
public hostility in the results of voir dire and the
use of peremptory challenges,45 in the sufficiency
of the jury instructions, 6 in public conduct,r in
the timing of the publication and the volume and
coverage of its circulation.A
Where public sentiment is not found to have
been sufficiently aroused to justify a change of
venue, the courts find that the defendant's rights
are protected by vair dire and jury instructions.49
On the other hand, where the publicity appears to
have been particularly damaging, other courts
have granted changes of venue without proof of
actual public prejudice.50 A change of venue
43 People v. Sangren, 75 N.Y.S.2d 753, 190 Misc. 810
(1947); Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704 (9th
Cir. 1948).
"State v. Collins, 50 Wash.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660
(1957); Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190 (5th
Cir. 1957).45 Many courts have denied continuance or change
of venue because voir dire did not expose alleged hostile
sentiment toward the accused. The claimed prejudice
must exist throughout the county from which the jury
is selected and not merely in any one part of the county.
Keeton v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1958);
People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104 N.E. 804
(1914); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2nd Cir.
1952).
In examining the results of voir dire in State v.
Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), the
court considered that only fourteen out of forty-seven
available jurors were dismissed in selecting a jury and
that the defense exercised only five of his six peremptory
challenges. See also: Irvin v. Dowd, 357 U.S. 374
(1959); State v. Faciane, 237 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333
(1958); Shuskan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir. 1941).
46 See note 40 supra.
47 In Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) the
state militia was called upon to keep the peace in the
community during the trial. In State v. Faciane, 237
La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1958) the defendant was re-
moved to an adjoining county to await trial so as to re-
move him from threats of the public.
4Change of venue denied, where publicity and
sentiment were so wide spread that defendant could
get no fairer trial elsewhere. State v. Rini, 153 La. 57,
95 So. 400 (1923); Schockley v. United States, 166 F.2d
704 (9th Cir. 1948). Change of venue is also denied
where sentiment is localized and does not cover all of
the county. See note 44 supra.
The courts have denied a remedy on the ground that
the publicity was too remote from the trial where the
publication was made ten months prior to trial, State v.
Jager, 85 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1957); six weeks prior to
trial, People v. Stroble, 36 Cal.2d 615, 226 P.2d 330,
a'd, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); and four weeks prior to trial,
People v. Fernandez, 89 N.Y.S.2d 421, 195 Misc. 95
(1949).
4 See notes 36 and 40 supra.
50 Where the defendant was indicted and ready for
preserves the defendant's right to a prompt trial
and thus assures that the memory of witnesses
will not fade and that his incarceration pending
trial will not be unduly prolonged. This remedy will
avoid harmful publicity, if it is local in natu-re. It
is more than likely, however, that in a time of mass
communications, the publicity will reach the new
forum before the defendant.
.The opportunity of obtaining a continuance
not only denies the defendant a prompt trial but
also provides time for witnesses to disappear or
for their memories to dim. Moreover, this remedy
cannot assure the defendant that the publicity will
not be renewed and public sentiment refreshed at
the time of trial.
Generally, where the defendant has applied for
a procedural remedy during the trial process. the
courts have not required that the clear and present
danger test be applied. In Leviton v. United Slates,5'
however, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the test of the state contempt cases
and required the defendant to prove that the
newspaper publicity constituted a clear and present
danger to his right to a fair trial. Judge Frank
strongly dissented on the ground that contempt
cases do not involve the same issues as change of
venue cases and should not be subject to the same
standards of proof.' In the contempt cases, the
court faces the problem of limiting freedom of the
press, and a grave threat to the administration of
trial but a few days prior to trial a sub-committee of a
Senate investigating committee made public damaging
information, since the publicity was nation-wide, a
change of venue would not have insured a fair trial,
thus the court held defendant should have been granted
a continuance for longer than one month because of
public sentiment adverse to him. Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). Also see: United
States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) where
publicity was particularly intense on the morning the
jury was to be impanelled.
In People v. Murawski, 394 Ill. 236, 128 N.E. 387
(1946), where publicity was published during the trial
in the community's only newspaper, the court did not
require proof of actual prejudice. Or where the prose-
cutor made public prejudicial information during the
trial for no acceptable purpose other than to influence
the jury, no proof of actual prejudice was required.
Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1957);
Griffen v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3rd Cir. 1924);
Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 640 (6th Cir.
1955).
51 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2nd Cir. 1951) (defendant was
convicted of violation of the federal export act, senate
investigating committee made public during the trial
other crimes defendant committed, the court required
that defendant prove such publicity constituted a clear
and present danger to his receiving a fair trial.)
52 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2nd Cir. 1951).
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justice must be proved before the press will be
restrained. In the change of venue and continuance
cases, however, the court is faced with the question
of whether the defendant's right to a fair trial has
been infringed. And it may be that the publicity,
although it will justify a procedural remedy, will
not constitute contempt of Court.-
Under the Supreme Court holding in Stroble v.
California,n newspaper publicity six weeks prior
to the trial was found to be insufficient ground for
reversal in the absence of proof of public hostility
toward the accused, a test similar to that applied
by the state courts. In Sheppard v. Florida,55 how-
ever, where the publicity was accompanied by a
charge on the jail to lynch the defendant, by the
burning of defendant's home, by forcing defend-
ant's relatives to leave town in fear of their lives,
by calling out the state militia, and by enforcing
special court rules to preclude weapons and keep
order in the court room, Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, thought the
press had sufficiently aroused public sentiment
hostile to the accused so as to deny him due
process of law.
The Supreme Court does not apply the clear
and present danger doctrine in deciding issues
related to change of venue or continuance. Never-
theless, by requiring proof of strong adverse public
sentiment, the Court gives effect to a harsh
standard of proof. The public may be prejudiced
against the accused without such prejudice being
evidenced by actual public hostility.
If procedural relief is to be a remedy for trial by
newspaper, the degree of proof of prejudice re-
quired must be eased. Some evidence of a more
liberal view is found in the concurring opinion of
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in the Sheppard
case where, having found the publicity was so
inflammatory that it rendered the judicial process a
sham, Mr. Justice Jackson said, "These convic-
tions, accompanied by such events [publicity], do
53 The Supreme Court of the United States supports
Judge Frank, for in Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181,
191 (1952), the Court stated that it is not considering a
contempt case; rather, it was considering whether press
publicity had so prejudiced the defendant that a fait
trial could not be had. The Court considered the fair
trial issues without applying the clear and present
danger test.
5 343 U.S. 181 (1952). The defendant was convicted
of murdering a young girl. Publicity six weeks prior to
his trial was claimed to be prejudicial to his receiving a
fair trial; the Court, however, found that defendant
failed to prove that the articles gave rise to any hostile
sentiment toward him in the community.
5s 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
not meet any civilized conception of due process of
law. That alone is sufficient, to my mind, to war-
rant reversal. ' 56 The idea here presented, of auto-
matic reversal, to cure the inflammatory effects
of publicity without proof of actual prejudice was
also expressed by Justice Frankfurter, dissenting
in Stroble, where he said, "I cannot agree to uphold
a conviction which affirmatively treats newspaper
participation instigated by the prosecutor as a part
of the "traditional concept of the American way of
conduct of the trial!"'- He then added, "The moral
health of the community is strengthened by
according even the most miserable and pathetic
criminal those rights which the constitution has
designed for all."2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
strong stand on reversal leads one to believe that
he would favor a more liberal stand in granting
continuances and changes of venue.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Marshall
v. United States59 furthers the views of Justices
Jackson and Frankfurter by holding that the
trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard
newspaper articles concerning the trial was not
sufficient to protect the accused's right to a fair
trial even though the jurors claimed their reading
of the articles did not prejudice them. The Court
handed down a brief opinion, limiting itself to the
particular facts of the case; nevertheless the
opinion does show a movement by the Court in
the direction of relief for the accused from trial by
newspaper.
Mistrial is not a completely adequate remedy,
for the defendant must again stand trial, pay fees,
and hope that witnesses are available and that
their memories are undimmed by time. And still
the defendant has no assurance that the stigma
of the first trial will not carry over to the second
trial to refresh the publicity and public sentiment.
Nevertheless, an automatic reversal could be more
than a remedial process to protect the defendant.
It could also be used to reprimand officers of the
court and those involved in law enforcement who
may disclose information or express opinions
prejudicial to the defendant. Reversal might also
act as a reprimand to the press, who though they
have no interest in the trial, may reconsider their
policy when they find that their publications have
resulted in the reversal of an otherwise valid
conviction.
56 Id. at 53.
57343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952).
61 Id. at 202.
5 See note 41 supra.
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Conclusion
In any consideration of the various remedies of
an accused to shield him from public prejudice
stimulated by inadvertent publicity, one factor is
always prevalent. Once public sentiment has been
aroused, once the publications have been made,
the accused's right to a fair and impartial jury
trial has probably been infringed, and the initial
presumption of innocence is difficult to achieve.
Weighing the values of a press free from re-
straint by the courts, and of a trial free from
prejudice by the press, punishment of the press
for constructive contempt may be too high a price
to pay for the elimination of trial by newspaper.
The use of constructive contempt is objectionable
because its bounds and limits are undefined and
left to be acted upon at the sole discretion of the
court in a summary proceeding.
Of the fe7w state contempt cases to reach the
Supreme Court, where the press has been held in
constructive contempt for its publications, none
has involved a legislative enactment designating
the limits of the court's discretion, defining con-
temptuous material, or establishing other than
summary procedure. The Court in the Bridges
case noted that no California statute was under
consideration." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dis-
senting in Bridges, analogizes trial by newspaper
to the federal crime of obstructing justice. 6'
Perhaps a criminal code providing for indictment,
arraignment, and trial by jury for the designated
and defined crime of trial by newspaper would
fulfill the needs of justice. Nevertheless, even if a
statute were enacted, it would still be subject to
interpretation under the clear and present danger
0 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S 252, 260, 269
(1941).
61314 U.S. 252, 305 (1941). Dissenting, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter refers to what is currently 62 STAT. 769,
18 U.S.C. 1503 (1948) which provides, "Whoever cor-
ruptly or by threats of force or by any threatening
letter or communication, endeavors to influence, in-
timidate, or impede any witness ... or any grand or
petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United
States shall by fined... or imprisoned... or both." A
companion section, 62 STAT. 770, 18 U.S.C. 1504 (1948),
provides, "Whoever attempts to influence the action or
decision of any grand or petit jury of any court of the
United States on any issue or matter pending before
such juror or the jury of which he is a member, or per-
taining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any
written communication in relation to such issue or
matter shall be fined.., or imprisoned ... or both."
Note that section 1503 of 18 U.S.C. requires corrupt
intent, threats or force, while section 1504 of 18 U.S.C.
would require merely an attempt to influence, but
neither statute applies directly to the press nor defines
what would be the crime of trial by newspaper.
doctrine. As the Court stated in Bridges, "legisla-
tive preferences or beliefs cannot transform mat-
ters of public inconvenience or annoyance into
substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant
the curtailment of liberty of expression." -'
To avoid the constitutional problems of re-
straining the press, the defendant may take
advantage of procedural steps to avoid adverse
publicity. Although some authors have argued
that on voir dire a more liberal number of chal-
lenges should be allowed to combat adverse
publicity, a jury might never be selected if every
prospective juror who had read or knew of prejudi-
cial publicity was excused. Likewise, the court's
instructions to a jury may be of doubtful value,
for no one can predict whether a jury will decide
solely on the evidence presented in court. And in
some cases, instructions to the jury may even be
harmful, for they may arouse the interest of the
jurors and lead them to read prejudicial articles
contrary to the court's instructions.
Change of venue and continuance would provide
the accused with opportunity to gain an impartial
trial without placing restraints on the press. How-
ever, the law with respect to changes of venue and
continuances requires not only proof of prejudicial
publicity but also of resulting public hostility so
strong as to make a fair trial unlikely. This
standard of proof is too high. Publicity may have a
prejudicial effect on prospective jurors without
necessarily causing outbursts of public hostility. A
more liberal standard of proof of prejudice should
be developed in order to allow greater use of
change of venue and continuance. The liberal
standards of proof that should be developed for
change of venue and continuance should also be
applicable to motions for mistrial, where the
publication is made during the trial.
Trial by newspaper might also be fought on
another front beyond the reach of the defendant
but within the reach of the bench and the bar. In
many instances prejudicial news releases are made
by persons related to the trial, such as the defense
or prosecuting attorneys or police officers.63 Canon
n See note 60 supra, at 263.
Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951) (the
press published statements of the sheriff that the
defendant had confessed); Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 65 A.2d 497 (1949) (Commis-
sioner of Police disclosed facts of the accused's criminal
record, confession, re-enactment of the crime); People v.
Murawski, 394 111. 236, 128 N.E. 387 (1946) (Prosecutor
disclosed prior trial and acquital of defendant for same
crime). Two pehding State cases involving statements of
19591
